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Chief executives are being called in for a closed-door briefing on Russia

Qurexa Editorial Team27 September 20267 min read 0 0
Chief executives are being called in for a closed-door briefing on Russia

What happened

On 25 September 2026, the Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence announced that chief executives from sensitive parts of the UK economy will be given closed-door briefings about threats from Russia. The invitations are going to two groups: companies that run critical national infrastructure, and defence companies. Critical national infrastructure means the things a country cannot function without — energy, water, transport, communications, finance and health. The government's description of the threat is direct. Russia uses cyber attacks, sabotage and disinformation to disrupt organisations that support British interests and Ukrainian defence. The briefing is designed to share intelligence that these companies would not otherwise see, and to ask them to strengthen their own defences in return. Security Minister Dan Jarvis, who is chairing the session, said: 'Strong defences are built on a clear understanding of the threat. That's why I'll be chairing this briefing, to share world-class intelligence with some of the most important organisations in the country.' Armed Forces Minister Louise Sandher-Jones said: 'Russia is actively seeking to disrupt the organisations that form the bedrock of our national security. By bringing government and defence industry leaders together, we can deepen our shared understanding of the threat.' Similar briefings have already been held this year for university leaders and for political parties.

Why this matters

It is tempting to file this as something that happens to other people — big companies, government departments, defence firms. That is not quite how it works. Critical national infrastructure runs on suppliers. A hospital depends on a pharmacy wholesaler, a laundry, a medical gas supplier, an IT contractor, a courier. An energy network depends on maintenance firms and software providers. Attackers know this. Getting into a large, well-defended organisation is hard. Getting into a small supplier who has a login to that organisation's system is often much easier. That is why these briefings ask about 'collective resilience' rather than just each company's own defences. A chain is only as strong as its weakest supplier. The health angle is not hypothetical. Disruption to NHS-linked IT systems has, in the past, delayed operations, blocked access to patient records and forced services to fall back on paper. When that happens, the harm is not abstract. It is a cancelled appointment or a prescription that cannot be checked. The second thing worth noticing is what the government is doing here. It is choosing to share intelligence rather than simply issue warnings. That is a recognition that a company cannot defend against a threat it has never been told about.

What the evidence actually says

A few things should be stated precisely, because this is an area where language often runs ahead of evidence. The announcement is about a briefing, not about a specific incident. It does not say that a particular attack has just happened, and it does not name a target. It describes an ongoing pattern of activity — cyber attacks, sabotage and disinformation — aimed at organisations supporting British interests and Ukraine's defence. The named sectors are critical national infrastructure and defence. Other sectors are not mentioned, though the government notes that comparable briefings have already gone to universities and political parties, which suggests the approach is being extended rather than narrowed. What businesses are being asked to do is described in general terms: partner with government, and take action to strengthen their own defences and collective resilience. The release points to existing support that already exists for this — cyber expertise and security advice services. What the announcement does not include is any figure for the number of attacks, their cost, or their success rate. That is normal for this kind of statement and it is better not to fill the gap with speculation. For context on scale, though, other UK bodies do publish data. UK education alone recorded many millions of attempted attacks during 2026, which gives some sense of the background level of activity against non-defence sectors.

Qurexa perspective

We are a healthcare logistics business. We hold patient names, addresses, delivery details and information about medicines. That is exactly the kind of data that matters to people, and it is exactly the kind of data that attackers want. So the supplier point in this announcement is about companies like ours, not only about the very large organisations getting the briefing. Anyone who handles health information or connects to NHS systems is part of the chain being described. We think it is worth saying that plainly rather than treating cyber security as something that happens in a server room. It means keeping access to records limited to people who need it, keeping systems patched, training staff to spot a convincing fake email, and having a plan for the day something does go wrong. We would also rather our customers knew to be sceptical. If you get a message claiming to be from us and it asks for a payment, a password or a code, it is not from us. Ring us on a number you already have.

Practical advice

Most of what protects an organisation also protects a household. These are the steps with the best return. 1. Turn on two-factor authentication on your email first. Your email is the key to resetting every other password you own. It deserves the strongest protection. 2. Use a password manager, or the three-random-words method the National Cyber Security Centre recommends. Reused passwords are how one breach becomes five. 3. Install updates when you are prompted, not eventually. Most successful attacks use a flaw that had already been fixed. 4. Back up anything that would hurt to lose, and keep one copy that is not connected to your computer or network. This is the single defence that works against ransomware. 5. If you run a small business, look at the NCSC's Cyber Essentials scheme and its free Small Business Guide. Larger customers increasingly ask suppliers for this, so it is commercially useful as well as protective. 6. Be sceptical of urgency in any message, especially about money or credentials. Disinformation and fraud both rely on people reacting rather than checking. 7. If you have care or medicines that depend on a system working — online repeat prescriptions, for example — it does no harm to know the offline route as well. Knowing your surgery's phone number and your pharmacy's address is a small, cheap form of resilience.

What to know

The government is giving closed-door intelligence briefings to chief executives of critical national infrastructure and defence companies about Russian cyber attacks, sabotage and disinformation. Security Minister Dan Jarvis is chairing the session, and similar briefings have already been given to university leaders and political parties. This is about a pattern of activity, not a single named incident, and the announcement contains no figures on attacks or costs. The part that reaches beyond the invited room is the supply chain. Large organisations are defended; their smaller suppliers often are not, and that is frequently the way in. Health services in particular depend on a long chain of suppliers, and past IT disruption has meant cancelled appointments and records that could not be reached. For individuals, the useful response is unglamorous: two-factor authentication on your email, strong and unique passwords, prompt updates, a backup that is not plugged in, and a healthy suspicion of anything urgent. Sources: Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence, 'CEOs from sensitive sectors to receive briefings on Russia threats', 25 September 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ceos-from-sensitive-sectors-to-receive-briefings-on-russia-threats ; National Cyber Security Centre, 'Small Business Guide: Cyber Security', https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/small-business-guidance--response-and-recovery ; National Cyber Security Centre, 'Cyber Essentials', https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview This article is for general information and does not replace advice from a doctor, pharmacist or other qualified healthcare professional.

#cyber security#critical national infrastructure#resilience#NCSC#business#sabotage

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